Barriers to evidence-based disaster management in Nepal: a qualitative study by Lee, A.C.K.
	



	



	

	
				
 !

∀#∃%& ∋()∗+	
,−	./.	0
1			23−4	∀(,(∋)5660∋∋,∋)
		7

/(∋(∋()8 ∋()∋(∋∋!
			
	
	9	

				

Title: Barriers to evidence-based disaster management in Nepal: a qualitative study 
 
Author: Dr Andrew Chee Keng Lee, MBChB MSc 
Institution: The School of Health and Related Research, the University of Sheffield 
Address: Regent Court, 30 Regent Street, Sheffield S1 4DA, United Kingdom 
Email: Andrew.lee@shef.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 114 2220872 
Fax: +44 114 2724095 
 
  
Barriers to evidence-based disaster management in Nepal: a qualitative study 
 
Abstract 
Objectives 
Globally, the incidence of natural disasters is increasing with developing countries tending to be 
worst affected. Implementing best practices in disaster management that are evidence-based is 
essential in order to improve disaster resilience and response. This study explores the barriers to 
evidence-based disaster management encountered in Nepal. 
 
Study design 
A qualitative study was conducted in Nepal involving interviews with key informants in the disaster 
management field. 
 
Methods 
Government officials, academics, programme managers, disaster management practitioners and 
policymakers involved in disaster management were purposively sampled and invited to interview. 
11 agreed to participate and were interviewed. The face-to-face interviews were recorded, 
transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis.  
 
Results 
The interviews uncovered population-level barriers such as contextual factors (e.g. poverty), local 
custom and culture, as well as community-level issues (e.g. level of engagement and understanding). 
System-level barriers included limited demand for, availability and accessibility of the evidence-base. 
The implementation of evidence was influenced by the configuration of the disaster management 
system and system processes. Political ownership and leadership is an essential determinant of 
practice. 
Conclusions 
Several barriers to evidence-based practice in disaster management exist in Nepal. The relative 
influence of the different barriers varies with political determinants likely to have greater 
importance in countries such as Nepal where system governance and leadership is insufficiently 
developed. These issues affect a country's vulnerability to disasters and need to be addressed. 
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Barriers to evidence-based disaster management in Nepal: a qualitative study 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s was declared by the United Nations General Assembly as the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction in recognition of the need for coordinated efforts internationally to 
mitigate the human and economic consequences of natural disasters. Since then, the frequency of 
disasters has not lessened, but paradoxically increased over the past 2 decades.(1, 2) Globally, in 
2012 there were 357 reported natural disasters affecting 123 million people and resulting in US$157 
billion in economic damage.(3) This estimate of the human toll of disasters is probably a gross 
underestimate due to considerable under-reporting that occurs.(4)  
 
Most disasters afflict poorer nations that lack the resilience and means to respond to disasters. In 
addition to the human toll, disasters damage property and infrastructure, heighten risk of infectious 
disease outbreaks, threaten food security, cause social and economic disruption, and lead to 
population displacement.(5, 6) Disasters also delay or even reverse the development of these 
nations.(7) These countries require effective disaster management including appropriate disaster 
risk reduction action to be undertaken to mitigate their vulnerability as well as effective emergency 
responses when disasters occur in order to minimize the adverse consequences of disasters.(1)   
 
Key to this is the implementation of evidence-based  ?ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞs ?in disaster management.(8, 9) 
Evidence-based ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚďŽƌƌŽǁƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ?Evidence-based ŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ? ?D ?
movement whereby professional practice is based upon sound research evidence about the 
effectiveness of each intervention, and is seen as the gold standard doctrine for decision-
making.(10),ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝŶĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌmanagement particularly in 
low- and middle-income country (LMIC) settings is hampered by the paucity of the evidence-base.(8, 
11) There are also considerable uncertainties with regards to how evidence-based practice is best 
achieved. Reviews from high-income countries have identified various determinants and barriers to 
developing evidence-based practice in disaster management such as knowledge management issues, 
system configuration issues and behavioural aspects.(12, 13) However, it is unclear whether these 
determinants are identical in developing countries. This study seeks to uncover the barriers to 
implementing evidence-based practice for disaster management in a LMIC setting using Nepal as a 
case study.  
 
METHODS 
A qualitative study was carried out involving key informant interviews with academics, programme 
managers, disaster management practitioners and policymakers involved in disaster management in 
Nepal.  
 
In choosing a case study site, we sought a LMIC that was vulnerable to and had experience of 
disasters. Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world with an estimated GDP per capita of 
US$735 in 2011/12. Each year, Nepal experiences on average nearly 300 natural disasters such as 
lightning strikes, floods, earthquakes and landslides.(14) Between 1971-2012, there were over 
28,000 casualties from these natural disasters. EĞƉĂů ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŵĂũŽƌĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚďǇ
the recent earthquake in 2015 in the Kathmandu Valley that killed more than 8,600 persons and 
injured a further18,500.(2, 15) 
 
An additional critical selection criterion used was access to senior policymakers and programme 
managers in the government, UN agencies and non-governmental organisations involved in this 
field. We were able access to this target group of individuals with the assistance of 2 non-
governmental organisations, Disaster Prevention Network Nepal (DPNet-Nepal) and PHASE Nepal, 
with whom we had good research links with who had the relevant professional networks locally. 
 
These individuals were identified and purposively selected on the basis of their expertise, senior 
role, knowledge and/or experience in this field. A degree of snowballing was also used to identify 
other key informants to invite to interview.  Participation was entirely voluntary and not 
remunerated. Signed informed consent was obtained and their responses were anonymised to 
protect their identity. Interviews were conducted in English by the researcher.  
 
In total, 11 participants were recruited from diverse backgrounds (Table 1): 5 senior government 
officials/politician, 2 senior programme managers from UN agencies, and 4 from non-governmental 
organisations. 2 participants were academics in this field as well. All the participants were Nepalese. 
 
Table 1. Background of key informants 
Background of key 
informants 
Government 
Official or 
Member of 
Parliament 
Academic/ 
Researcher 
Inter-
governmental 
organisation  
(e.g. UN agency) 
Non-governmental 
organisation 
Participant 1 я я     
Participant 2 я я     
Participant 3 я       
Participant 4 я       
Participant 5 я       
Participant 6     я   
Participant 7     я   
Participant 8       я 
Participant 9       я 
Participant 10       я 
Participant 11       я 
 
An interview schedule was devised based on a schedule used in another similar study to explore 
barriers to evidence-based emergency planning practice in the UK.(13) The set of interview 
questions was pre-tested to ensure clarity. The questions explored: how disaster plans and policies 
ǁĞƌĞĚĞǀŝƐĞĚĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?ĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƉůĂŶƐŝŶĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐ ?ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨ
information, evidence, guidance or advice used on which to base disaster management decisions; 
interviewees ? perceptions of the reliability of these information sources and the extent to which 
they relied on them. Interviewees were asked to reflect on possible knowledge gaps and research 
priorities in this field, and we explored deficiencies, difficulties and issues encountered in disaster 
management.  
 
Hour-long interviews were conducted face-to-face with participants and took place between 
December 2013 and October 2014. Interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed. 
Interview data were then analysed using standard qualitative methodology using framework 
analysis. This involved initial coding of the data, followed by subsequent development of a 
hierarchical framework of themes in order to categorise interview data into key themes and 
concepts, with successive levels of sub-themes as they emerge from the analysis.(16) The thematic 
framework were then organised into a mindmap from which patterns and linkages were identified. 
Analysis was carried out concurrently with the interviews which allowed some questions in the later 
interviews to be iteratively adapted to explore emergent themes. Thematic saturation was likely to 
have been achieved as by the penultimate 2-3 interviews no new themes emerged.  
 
RESULTS 
The themes and subthemes from the interviews are summated into 2 categories: population-level 
and system-level barriers. System-level barriers included the following subcategories: disaster 
management system issues, knowledge management issues, and political/legal factors. Population-
level barriers included culture, context and community factors. (Figure 1) These are described 
further below: 
 
Figure 1. Map of themes and subthemes from the interviews 
 
 
Context, culture and community-level barriers 
The context in which a community is situated influences their vulnerability in terms of what local 
hazards are present. It also determines what physical resources are available to that community. 
These in turn depend on the physical geography of the region and climatic conditions. Similarly, the 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ socioeconomic profile dictates the availability of financial resources locally. For 
example, respondents described a  “ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇƚƌĂƉ ? situation that prevented vulnerable persons 
relocating to safer areas even when they knew they were living in a disaster-prone area: 
 
ǀĞŶŝĨǇŽƵŐŽƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƚĞůů ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? “/ƚŝƐŚĂǌĂƌĚŽƵƐ ?ŝƚŝƐĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ- don't live here, go 
ƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞĞůƐĞ ? ? ?ƚŚĞǇĂƐŬŚŽǁĐĂŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌŶĂůŝǀŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉĂǇƚŚĞŵĂŶ
unemployment allowanĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞE'KƐ ?/E'KƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞŵĂŶǇŵŽŶĞǇŽƌĨŽŽĚ ?^Ž
ƚŚĞǇŐŽďĂĐŬƚŚĞƌĞ ?dŚĞǇŬŶŽǁƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞďƵƚƐƚŝůůƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽ ?dŚĞǇŬŶŽǁƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƐďƵƚ
they take the risk for their livelihoods, their survival ...  If they have a better option certainly they will 
not go back there.  
Government official 1/Academic 
 
Respondents repeatedly identified the importance of context and stressed the necessity for 
evidence and practice to be contextualised to the local setting, needs and understanding of the 
community. This adaptation was seen as essential in order to facilitate the ease of implementation 
of interventions by agencies and its adoption by the community: 
 
 “ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶŐŝǀŝŶŐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?if you are 
talking about Nepal, you have to know the actual problems, disaster risk related problems in Nepal 
like the source of the hazards first ...  How are they living with those hazards? How are they tackling 
the risks of those hazards? You have to analyse that so that from those experiences and analysis you 
can give solutions. Otherwise if you don't understand ƚŚĞƌĞĂůƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŚĂǌĂƌĚ ?then may be 
ǇŽƵƌ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝůůŶŽƚǁŽƌŬ ?dŚĂƚ(analysis of the local situation) will give different results, 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ǁĂǇƐŽĨŵŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĂǇƐŽĨĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?/ĨǇŽƵ
don't consult the local people and community, people who are really affected, if you don't consult 
ƚŚĞŵ ?ƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ ? ? 
NGO manager 1 
 
Disaster management is also influenced by a multitude of community-level determinants including 
its demographic make-up, the impact of migration and the degree of urbanisation. It is influenced by 
the extent and quality of social networks that acts as a safety net. Community involvement and 
engagement is important, particularly for building trust and to aid their understanding. As one NGO 
manager observed,  “hŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐǁŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞ
that trust. In order to build that trust we need to have social mobilisation in those communities that 
ĂƌĞĂƚƌŝƐŬ ? ?
 
Community engagement is also crucial for boosting community ownership for disaster risk reduction 
activities: 
 “ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƌŝƐŬƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝůůŽŶůǇďĞsuccessful if they (the community) own it 
... So when knowledge is transferred to them, then coping capacity has been enhanced, coping 
capacity strengthened, then the result is right there - losses can be minimized ... Preparedness can 
make a lot of sense ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ?
UN agency manager 1 
 
Whilst community engagement was universally agreed to be essential, issues were also identified 
such as low levels of community understanding that limit community involvement in disaster 
management planning and policy: 
 “ ?dŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůŽĐĂůůĞǀĞůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĞǇ
are also invited to give feedback on policy. But these were not very effective because of the 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ?ůĂĐŬŽĨ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? 
UN agency manager 2 
 
The degree of community engagement is influenced by prevailing attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, 
degree of public awareness and understanding. There is a culture of  “ůŝǀŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƌŝƐŬ ?partly due to 
socioeconomic circumstances that meant some communities could not relocate. This is associated 
with lessened risk perception as well as considerable fatalism. Fatalism could be pervasive, affecting 
the community as well as practitioners and policymakers, and can be a barrier to engagement in 
disaster preparedness and mitigation activities: 
 “dŚĞŵŝŶĚ-set of our whole planning system and perception towards disaster is that it is natural, 
God-given. Whatever will happen is because of bad deeds that our ancestors did in the past or our 
ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚůŝĨĞ ?tĞŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚŝŶŬĂďŽƵƚĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƌŝƐŬ
issues because if you think it is God's will, then people will wait for God to act and they won't make 
ĂŶǇƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
NGO Manager 2 
 
Other challenges to community engagement include pre-existing perceptions of their own role, 
expectations of other actors (particularly the government), as well as whether they felt any personal 
relevance and ownership of the agenda. As one NGO manager put it, there is a need  “ƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐĞƚ ?. 
 
System configuration and process barriers 
How the disaster management system operates and behaves is determined by existing processes 
(i.e. how things are done), and how the system is set up. Issues with coordination, clarity of roles 
and responsibilities, and fragmentation of the system were cited as problems: 
 “^ŽŵĞŚŽǁ ?ƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŝƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐďƵƚŝƚƐƚŝůůŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĞĚ ?ŶŽƚ
coordinated, not a clearly defined technical area or administrative roles of any institutions. So this is 
 ?ƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŐĂƉƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĂƌĞĨĂĐŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐ ?ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƚ
the working level, policy level and institutional level, and a blurring of the administrative and the 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?
Government official 2 
 
In addition, much of the focus seemed to be short term and on  ?ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? with less 
attention paid to disaster mitigation and recovery ? ?The government's priority is always for rescue 
and resƉŽŶƐĞǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ ? ?E'KDĂŶĂŐĞƌ ? The governance of the system was also 
cited as a problem as well as the lack of effective system leadership. One senior government official 
voiced the need for a  “ƐŝŶŐůĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĞŶƚŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ to coordinate all these 
 ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ?. There was also a reported lack of clarity as to which agency provides oversight 
and how governance is practised in reality. This has important ramifications in terms of clarity of 
roles and responsibilities, lines of communication, hierarchy of authority, and how the various 
agencies co-ordinate their actions with one another. 
 
Political/legal barriers 
The prevailing disaster management policy framework for the country was highlighted as a key 
weakness. One UN manager described the existing disaster management act as  “ŽůĚ ? and not fit for 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ?/ƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ ?dŚĂƚĐƚŝƐƌĞƐĐƵĞĂŶĚƌĞůŝĞĨĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶůǇ ?WƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
adaptation - ƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŶŽƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐƚ ? ?
This policy weakness manifests itself through a lack of harmonisation of institutional agendas and 
coordination of activities. There is also reportedly insufficient political ownership, commitment and 
policy direction.  This need for system leadership was stressed by various respondents as a key 
priority. Indeed, the lesser priority given to disaster management was attributed to the lack of 
political stability and political priority as much of the political focus has been on constitutional 
matters: 
 “hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌŝŐŚƚ
ŶŽǁ ?tĞĂƌĞŽŶůǇǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞůĞŐĂůďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƐĂƐƚĞƌĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĂŶǇ
fragmented institutions not coordinated but trying to be coorĚŝŶĂƚĞĚ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ?ŵĂŶǇĐƌŽƐƐ
discipline issues, so the main challenge is how to mainstream these cross disciplinary issues. It is still 
fragmented and not supported by the high level authorities ...  Yeah right now there is little progress 
 ?tĞĂƌĞƐƚŝůl in a political transition phase in Nepal - the main priority is the constitutional build-up 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƐĞŵŝŶŽƌƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ? 
Government Official 3 
 
In order to mainstream disaster management into the work of the line ministries political ownership 
of the agenda is crucial. Without ownership, disaster management is not prioritised or acted on. As 
one UN manager observed:  “dŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŽĂƚƚŚĞůŽǁĞƌůĞǀĞůǁŝůůŚĂǀĞĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚĂƚƚŚĞ
lower level. But unless we influence the policy (level) there will be very little of what we can (achieve) 
ĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇůĞǀĞů ? ? The lack of political ownership also translates into inadequacies in the 
legal framework or its enforcement on key aspects such as building regulations and codes. 
Inadequate government capacity was also cited as another reason why it was difficult to enforce 
existing legislation.   
 
There are furthermore multiple agencies present in the Nepali disaster management scene Also 
observed were the many external actors such as intergovernmental organisations (e.g. UN agencies), 
non-governmental organisations and aid donors, all of whom have different agendas that are not 
always harmonized with the national agenda or attuned to local needs. This leads to considerable 
fragmentation in how the system is coordinated and affects its ability to respond:  
 
 “tŚŽĂƌĞƚŚĞ(disaster) ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ?tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨ
emergencies? Are they able to coordinate?  ?zĞĂŚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚĞŝƌ^KWƐ ?^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ
Operating Procedures), but there are (many) different SOPs ... How do they match each other? (Are 
ƚŚĞǇ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨĂŵĞŐĂĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ? ? ? ?,ŽǁĂƌĞƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?
coordinated and how can they help each other? Otherwise (one agency will) do one thing and 
 ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĂŐĞŶĐǇǁŝůů ?ĚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƌĞĂ ŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĚƵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 ?ƐŽŵĞĂƌĞĂƐ ?ĂƌĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚŽĨ ?ĂŝĚ ?ĂƐŝƚŝƐŶŽƚǁĞůůŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ? ?
NGO manager 1 
 
The plurality of stakeholders present means that the disaster management system is less driven by 
ƚŚĞ ?evidence-base ?ďƵƚinstead by an amalgamation of different stakeholder agendas, both local 
and foreign. As one NGO manager summed it up P “dŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƌĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ?
Whilst the  ?evidence-base ?ŽŶŝƚƐŽǁŶdoes not make the case for disaster management to 
policymakers, it was acknowledged to be important for supporting and justifying decisions. 
 
Knowledge issues 
The final category is that of the evidence-base for disaster management. It is perhaps here where 
deficiencies appear greatest. There are gaps in the knowledge base that hamper the design and 
implementation of effective disaster reduction measures. Respondents reported difficulties 
accessing the evidence and challenges acquiring the evidence-base due to an apparent lack of 
demand for it in the first place. There was a need voiced to create an awareness of the evidence-
base and demonstrate its relevance to stakeholders in order to garner interest and demand. 
Research in this field was reported to be difficult, particularly due to the lack of robust and reliable 
data, or the means with which to collect data for research purposes. 
 
There were also different interpretations of what is defined as  ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŽŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽ
be an expert. Expertise and the evidence-base were associated with past experience and technical 
know-how. Experts were seen as individuals who could provide solutions to local problems and 
 ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂďƌŽĂĚŚĞůĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ? ?ǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵhigh-income countries 
were held in high regard. At the decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐůĞǀĞů ?ƚŚĞ ?evidence-base ?was said to be another 
competing voice in the political arena where there were conflicting interests and agendas held by 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶŝƚƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? some 
saw it as information used to support and back up their policies and programmes. Opinions were 
also sometimes conflated with evidence.  
 
The translation of evidence into practice was also problematic due to differing understanding and 
capacities of the various stakeholders: 
 
 “tĞŚĂǀĞƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶthe form of an NGO. So the level of what 
(our organisation knows), and the level (of understanding) of the NGO that is an implementing 
partner is different. To have that capacity built into the implementing partner takes time. That is one 
challenge. The way that we want to implement is not the same way of thinking as the implementing 
partner. So having that same level of understanding is another challenge ... Even if a lot of funds 
have been provided, what we can see is that it is not being translated or is not being reflected in the 
communities. So that is where the (knowledge) is lost between the implementing partner and the 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ? ?
NGO manager 3 
 
The need for practical solutions as well as the need to adapt the evidence so that it is locally relevant 
was repeatedly highlighted:  
 
 “tĞŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞǀĞƌǇĨůĞǆŝďůĞŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐŶĞĞĚ ? ? ?tĞŶĞĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ůŽĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĂƚŝƐǁŚǇZZ ?ŝƐĂƐƚĞƌZŝƐŬZĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ
many areas is failing  ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ƚŽŐĞƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶZZ ?ŝĨǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚ
understand their needs, if you could really understand their culture ... If we use imported ideas, 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚǁŽƌŬ ? ? 
NGO Manager 2 
 
There is also a lack of learning practice and processes to embed organisational learning in the 
system.  >ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŽĐĐƵƌŝŶĂĚŚŽĐŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ƉĂƐƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞs ?ŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
and individuals rather than in a system-wide manner done systematically. As one UN manager 
noted,  “ ?dŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂůǁĂǇƐtry to learn from each disaster. But the problem is the next 
disaster becomes a brand new disaster. It seems like ... we (have to re-learn) every time and I am 
very surprised that we haven't any system that starts working ĨƌŽŵĚĂǇŽŶĞ ?dŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? 
 
In addition to the lack of a learning culture, maintaining organisational memory is also reportedly 
hampered by staff turnover and shortage of skilled human resources in this field. One UN manager 
noted how  “ƉĞŽƉůĞŐĞƚ transferred from one (job) to another; they are moved from one kind of 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?^ŽŝƚŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĂůŝƚƚůĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞƚŚĞůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ? ?It was 
reported that many practitioners also come from development backgrounds with little formal 
training or qualification in disaster management.  
 
Another barrier to disseminating best practice is the degree of willingness of stakeholder 
organisations to share learning: 
 
 “>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŽĨďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝƐƐƚŝůůƚŚĞƌĞ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽƌƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ
ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŚĞůƉƚŽƐƉƌĞĂĚ ?ƚŚŝƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ?tŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇ ?ƚŚĞE'KƐ ?ǁŝůůďĞƌĞĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŽƌŶŽƚ
to share is a question. I realize there should be a national level government body which really makes 
ƚŚĞŵƐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĂƌĞŐƵůĂƌďĂƐŝƐ ?dŚĞŶƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚďĞďŽƵŶĚƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚ ? ? ? ?
UN agency manager 1 
 
There is also a lack of mechanisms for disseminating learning to all stakeholders, including decision-
makers. This makes it difficult to convince key policymakers who may lack awareness and 
understanding of the issues. Where there was some dissemination of knowledge, this tended to 
occur through professional networks. A further weakness was that whilst lessons were identified 
after a disaster, they were rarely learnt, i.e. not translated into any meaningful changes in how 
individuals, organisations and the system would respond to similar disasters in the future. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Implementing  ?ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝŶĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ in Nepal is clearly challenging and 
complicated. Central to this is the availability and accessibility of the evidence-base. The evidence-
base is known to be patchy(11) and there were difficulties reported acquiring, accessing and 
disseminating it. The lack of demand for the evidence, and different understanding as to what 
constitutes as evidence, further hampers the use of what is available. Local contextual factors such 
as poverty were frequently cited as a barrier to evidence-based practice. The translation of evidence 
into practice was also affected by how the disaster management system is configured and operates, 
but also by disaster management policies and legal frameworks. Indeed the importance of political 
ownership and leadership of this agenda was oft stressed.  
 
The findings reported support existing understanding of the determinants of population vulnerability 
and disaster resilience.(17) One conceptual model, the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework,(18) well-
describes the 5 types of capital required for resilience, i.e.  
x Human capital: e.g. health, education, coping strategies, ability to work 
x Natural capital: e.g. the availability and access to land, water, wildlife, animal resources 
x Social capital: e.g. the presence and strength of social networks and relationships 
x Financial capital: e.g. the dependability of income and availability of savings 
x Physical capital: e.g. the availability of transport infrastructure  
Interventions that address these 5 dimensions can help reduce vulnerability to crises. However, the 
population ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐĂůƐŽaffected by governmental and extra-governmental policies and 
processes. The adverse consequences of disasters can be exacerbated through poor governance and 
weak coordination between agencies. In Nepal, this manifested as a lack of clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, resource constraints and suboptimal management. The lack of proactive disaster 
management policies and other legal instruments may further potentiate the ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛdisaster 
vulnerability.(19) 
 
Moreover, from the interviews it also emerged that what is perceived to be  ?ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝƐĂ
contested term.(9) Best practice in medicine has often been equated with an evidence-based 
approach to inform medical decision-making.(20, 21) However, this approach is not easily 
transferable to disaster management due to the heterogeneity of disaster contexts. This suggests 
evidence has contextual specificity and means best practice in disaster management is not a 
concrete construct but will vary from situation to situation.  Best practice for each local situation 
may have to be identified and is likely to involve a rationalized marriage of the evidence-base and 
adaptations required to match local needs and circumstances. Neither is the implementation of 
 ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶƚŽ the population simple. Evidence exists in a complex socio-political arena influenced 
by local attitudes, culture, and customs, and has to compete against often conflicting agendas and 
priorities.(22) 
 
If the purpose of best practice is to realize the best possible outcomes in disaster management, the 
situation is yet much more complex. In addition to individual and community-level determinants, as 
well as the institutions and processes that interact with the community, there are other significant 
determinants of disaster management outcomes.(17) In Nepal, these included the set-up of the 
disaster management system locally, the presence and efficacy of system leadership, oversight and 
governance. The fragmented multi-agency nature of the disaster management system often leads to 
problems of coordination as well as ineffectual and inefficient disaster responses which characterize 
numerous disasters worldwide.(23-25) The striking finding of this study was the demand echoed by 
respondents for strong policy direction and leadership, as well as a supportive legislative framework 
that is implemented and enforced. These politico-legal aspects are key components of the disaster 
management system, acting as both catalyst and facilitating agent. The availability of an evidence-
base alone would be insufficient for improving either disaster management practice or outcomes. 
 
One limitation of this study was that public representatives were not interviewed. Whilst the 
community perspective would be invaluable, that said the focus of this study was an examination of 
the policy and practice of disaster management practitioners which often occurs behind the scenes. 
Consequently, the general public may neither be aware of what goes on or be best placed to provide 
insight into the processes. Attempts were made to address this by including 2 key informants with 
extensive community engagement experience.  
 
Another possible limitation was the small number of participants. However, the interviewees were 
drawn from a range of organisations involved in this field, and from senior positions. That said 
thematic saturation was believed to have been achieved, and further interviews were unlikely to 
yield new insights. It was anticipated that language could be an issue. However, as all of the 
participants were high-level professionals working with the government, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organisations, they all had considerable proficiency in spoken English. There was 
no evidence of respondent bias during the interviews and participants spoke openly and with 
candour. 
 
As this study is focused only on Nepal, further studies elsewhere would be invaluable in revealing 
other insights and would allow triangulation of findings and enable the generalisability of findings to 
be better established. The study identified difficulties with conducting research in this field but also 
reiterated the need for research in order to build the limited evidence-base available currently. 
Indeed, whilst disaster management is increasingly data driven, this does not equate to being 
evidence-based.(26) There is particularly a demand for research to ĨŝŶĚ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚĂŝůŽƌĞĚ
to local contexts. Similarly, there is a need for the empirical evidence in the academic literature to be 
better collated, disseminated and applied. At the policy level, the need for political advocacy, 
ownership and leadership was also highlighted, without which the disaster management agenda 
would not be able to gain traction. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Currently, there is a lack of demand for the evidence-base in disaster management in LMICs such as 
Nepal. What is available is meagre and not well applied, and there are significant hurdles to be 
overcome including contextual and system issues as well as political barriers.(11) It is too simplistic 
to see evidence-based practice solely in terms of individual interventions without recognition of the 
contributions made by the wider societal determinants. The relative influence of the different 
barriers will vary between countries, with political barriers being especially prominent in some 
countries such as Nepal where the system of governance and leadership is less well developed. The 
suboptimal development of an evidence-based disaster management system in Nepal previously is 
likely to have influenced the consequences of the 2015 earthquake. These issues contribute to the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞǇƵƌŐĞŶƚůǇŶĞĞĚĂĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŝĨbetter disaster management 
practice is to be achieved.    
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